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COEXISTENCE AND VIOLENCE:
THE CASE FOR EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY IN SRI LANKA
—Gehan Gunatilleke*
Equality of opportunity reflects the availability of opportunities to all individuals in a society to enable them to advance
their interests on an equal footing. This article discusses the
concept of equality of opportunity in the Sri Lankan context.
It explores Sri Lanka’s post-Independence socio-political and
constitutional history and examines the nexus between the
denial of formal and substantive equality of opportunity and
the emergence of violent conflict. This article presents a case
for making formal and substantive equality of opportunity
integral to advancing sustainable coexistence and ensuring
the non-recurrence of violent conflict in Sri Lanka. It analyses Sri Lanka’s commitment to equality of opportunity in its
formal constitutional framework and socio-political practice.
First, it analyses Sri Lanka’s constitutional framework and
the formal guarantees of equality of opportunity. Second, it
critically evaluates the extent to which these guarantees are
realized in practice and problematizes the ostensible gap
between formal law and socio-political practice. Finally,
it explores some of the major structural factors that motivate the denial of formal and substantive equality of opportunity in Sri Lanka: entitlement complexes, existential fears,
and institutional decay. The article concludes that equality
of opportunity can be formally and substantively guaranteed
only through a multi-pronged approach of constitutional,
cultural, and institutional reform. Such reform is crucial to
facilitate meaningful coexistence in Sri Lanka and to ensure
the non-recurrence of violent conflict.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Equality is a contested concept.1 Nevertheless, it remains a core value of
many democratic societies and is one of the ideals that underlie individual
rights.2 Equality of opportunity is often considered to be an integral part of the
broader ideal of equality.3 It essentially reflects the availability of opportunities
to all individuals in a society to enable them to advance their interests on an
equal footing.
This article discusses the concept of equality of opportunity in the Sri
Lankan context. It seeks to explain the relevance of this concept to ensure the
non-recurrence of violent conflict in Sri Lanka. It is presented in four sections.
The first section discusses the basic conceptual features of equality of opportunity and explores the ideas of formal and substantive equality of opportunity. The second section discusses Sri Lanka’s post-Independence history and
the nexus between the denial of equality of opportunity and the emergence
of violent conflicts. This section presents a historical case for why equality of
opportunity is integral to advancing sustainable coexistence and ensuring the
non-recurrence of violent conflict in Sri Lanka. The third section discusses Sri
Lanka’s current constitutional framework and the formal guarantees of equality
of opportunity. Moreover, it critically evaluates the extent to which these guarantees have been realized in practice. The final section of this article explores
some of the structural factors that motivate systemic denial of formal and substantive equality of opportunity in Sri Lanka. Three such factors are discussed:
entitlement complexes of majority communities, existential fears of majority
communities, and institutional decay. The article concludes with some thoughts
on the processes of cultural transformation and institutional reform that are
necessary to meaningfully guarantee formal and substantive equality of opportunity to all persons in Sri Lanka.
1

2

3

Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University
Press 2000) 2.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, recognizes: ‘All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (‘UDHR’) art 1. This same ideal is found
in the preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’) preamble.
See, for example, Richard Arneson, ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’ (1989)
56(1) Philosophical Studies 77; Gerald A Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’
(1989) 99(4) Ethics 906.
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
Equality of opportunity does not mean that all individuals in a society must
be categorically identical in every conceivable way. For example, it does not
mean that all individuals must receive an identical income regardless of their
capabilities and skill level. Instead, it ensures that all members of society are
eligible to compete on equal terms and that their positions in a social hierarchy
are determined through a competitive process.4 There are two conceptions of
equality of opportunity that are worth discussing: formal equality of opportunity and substantive equality of opportunity.
Formal equality of opportunity is generally opposed to assigning privilege or advantage based on birth or some other form of affiliation. It is based
on the Aristotelian idea that we must “treat like cases as like”.5 This notion
of equality postulates a “presumption against treating people differently”.6
The presumption simply means that everyone should be treated in the same
manner unless there is a sound justification for treating someone differently.
Importantly, the onus to justify differential treatment rests on whoever makes
the distinction.7 Many bases for differential treatment would be impermissible
under this notion of equality. For example, casteism (i.e., where one’s privilege
is predetermined by the caste group one belongs to) and nepotism (i.e., where
positions are offered based on membership in a family or social group) would
generally be impermissible. Political patronage, whereby political patrons offer
socio-economic benefits to their constituents, is also antithetical to the concept of formal equality of opportunity. Formal equality of opportunity requires
respect for the principle of non-discrimination.8 According to this principle,
all individuals must be able to advance their interests regardless of identity
markers, such as sex, ethnicity, religion, place of birth, age, or political affiliation.9 This principle, for instance, would apply to an individual’s access to
4

5

6

7

8

9

Richard Arneson, ‘Equality of Opportunity’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
(Summer edn, 2015) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/equal-opportunity/>
accessed 22 March 2020.
Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed), The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol
3 (Princeton University Press 1985).
SI Benn and RS Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State (Allen and Unwin 1959)
111.
ibid; Gerald F Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory
(OUP 1996) 163; Isaiah Berlin, ‘Equality as an Ideal’ in Frederick A Olafson (ed), Justice and
Social Policy: A Collection of Essays (Prentice-Hall 1961).
Evadre Grant, ‘Dignity and Equality’ (2007) 7(2) Human Rights Law Review 300;
Christopher McCrudden, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’ in David Feldman (ed), English
Public Law (OUP 2004). See also Larry Alexander, ‘What Makes Wrongful Discrimination
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies’ (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 149.
International treaties and national constitutions, including the Sri Lankan and Indian
Constitutions, often contain lists of grounds based on which a person may not be discriminated against. See ICCPR, art 2(1); Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
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means of generating income. While it does not guarantee an identical income
to everyone, it guarantees that all individuals are permitted to generate an
income without facing any discrimination. For example, the refusal to employ
a person or transact with a person based solely on an identity marker, such
as sex, ethnicity, or religion would amount to discrimination and a violation
of formal equality of opportunity. According to scholars such as Christopher
McCrudden, the principle of merit underlies formal equality of opportunity,
and selecting candidates on this basis would conform to the principles of formal equality of opportunity.10 Factors such as quality of a good or service, academic qualifications, specifically acquired skills (such as language skills), and
experience can be used as criteria for determining merit.
Substantive equality of opportunity goes further than formal equality
of opportunity. This conception is not based solely on meritocracy but also
requires that “sufficient opportunity to develop the qualifications needed for
successful application is available to all”.11 Substantive equality of opportunity focuses on the discriminatory effect of a criterion and on the structural
factors that underlie that effect. For example, formal equality of opportunity may require candidates to be competent in the English language; it may
then select those candidates who possess that competence. This requirement
does not appear to have a discriminatory intent, as all candidates are judged
equally. However, if social stratification and poverty deprives certain segments
of society of the opportunity to learn English and acquire this competence,
the criterion may have a discriminatory effect. Substantive equality of opportunity requires that the opportunity to develop skills is provided to everyone
equally. It, according to Sandra Fredman, “aims to equalize the starting point
rather than the end result”.12 For example, in a situation where English competence is necessary for accessing employment, substantive equality of opportunity would ensure that prospective candidates receive an equal opportunity to
learn English. The extent to which such opportunities are afforded to everyone
remains open for discussion. John Rawls, for instance, discusses “fair equality
of opportunity” in this context.13 Rawls observes that fair equality of opportunity refers to the idea that “positions are to be not only open in a formal
sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them”; “those with similar abilities and skills should … have the same prospects of success regardless

10
11
12

13

Lanka 1978, art 12(2); Constitution of India 1950, art 15(1). See also Paul Brest, ‘In Defense
of the Antidiscrimination Principle’ (1976) 90 Harvard Law Review 1.
Christopher McCrudden, ‘Merit Principles’ (1998) 18(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 543.
Arneson (n 4).
Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14(3) Intl Journal of Constitutional
Law 723.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2nd edn, Harvard University Press 1999) 63. Rawls
famously framed the ‘difference principle’ in the following terms: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the
least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity’. (emphasis added)
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of their initial place in the social system”.14 Substantive equality of opportunity requires everyone to at least have fair equality of opportunity to acquire
the skills that are necessary for accessing benefits. However, it also requires
the elimination of structural impediments to acquiring such skills. It would
ordinarily justify certain forms of affirmative action when a certain group is
structurally denied an equal opportunity to gain skills. For example, if social
stratification and historical circumstances deprive a child of the opportunity to learn English, substantive equality of opportunity may require special
measures to be taken to ensure that the child receives this opportunity. The
conception of substantive equality of opportunity that I have in mind is similar to Fredman’s conception of substantive equality. Fredman proposes a four
dimensional approach to substantive equality: first, it should “aim to redress
disadvantage”; second, it should “counter prejudice, stigma, stereotyping,
humiliation, and violence based on a protected characteristic”; third, it should
“enhance voice and participation, countering both political and social exclusion”; and fourth, it should “accommodate difference and achieve structural
change”.15 Such a holistic and multidimensional conception may be crucial to
ensuring meaningful equality of opportunity in Sri Lanka.

III. THE SRI LANKAN CONTEXT
Sri Lanka’s post-Independence history features the denial of both formal
and substantive equality of opportunity to certain sections of society. This
section explores three historical examples: the denial of citizenship to the Hill
Country Tamil community; the exclusion of the Tamil speaking community
from public sector employment and tertiary education; and the marginalization
of Southern youth from economic opportunities. The latter two cases can be
directly linked to violent conflict in Sri Lanka.
When Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) gained Independence in 1948, one of the
first legislative measures adopted by the new legislature concerned citizenship.
The criteria set out in the Citizenship Act, No. 18 of 1948 effectively denied
citizenship to a large number of Tamils living on plantations located in what
is called the Hill Country of Sri Lanka.16 The community comprised persons
of Indian origin who had migrated to Sri Lanka to work on British-owned

14
15
16

ibid.
Fredman (n 12) 727.
According to Section 2(2) of the Act:
a person shall be or become entitled to the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka in one of
the following ways only: (a) by right of descent as provided by this Act; (b) by virtue
of registration as provided by this Act or by any other Act authorizing the grant of
such status by registration in any special case of a specified description.
The provision effectively denied citizenship to many Hill Country Tamils who were not born
in Sri Lanka. Citizenship by descent was based on paternal ancestry, and persons born outside
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coffee and tea plantations. Close to a million members of this community were
denied voting rights due to the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Amendment)
Act, No. 48 of 1949, which made citizenship status a requirement for voting
in elections.17 These legislative measures denied formal equality of opportunity to the Hill Country Tamil community, which resulted in their long-term
socio-economic marginalization. For instance, the denial of voting rights to the
community resulted in an inability to elect local government institutions. This
inability eventually led to exclusion from receiving basic state services, such
as transportation, postal services, and roads within the plantations that they
resided in.18 Even after the legislative reform that began in the 1980s and eventuated in the Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act, No. 35 of
2003,19 the community continues to face major challenges in terms of acquiring the skills and qualifications that are necessary for upward social mobility.
For instance, the community remains the least developed in terms of accessing primary, secondary, and tertiary education in Sri Lanka when compared
to the populations residing in urban and rural areas.20 Such structural discrimination has denied the Hill Country Tamil community substantive equality of
opportunity.
Government policies on language have denied ‘Tamil-speaking communities’21 equal access to public sector employment and tertiary education. In
1956, the Sri Lankan government enacted the Official Language Act, No. 33
of 1956, which made Sinhala the official language. Sinhala was spoken by

17

18

19

20

21

Sri Lanka had to prove a longer line of paternal ancestry than those born in Sri Lanka.
Meanwhile, acquiring citizenship by registration imposed several conditions such as evidence
of either parent being a citizen of Sri Lanka and the presentation of other documentary evidence that was difficult to obtain in practice. For example, it required the support of three citizens by descent who must be acquainted intimately with the person applying for citizenship.
See Section 3(1) of this Act. The Act amended Section 4 of the Ceylon (Parliamentary
Elections) Order in Council, 1946 and added citizenship as a qualification to be a voter. See
also Mudanayake v Sivagnanasunderam, (1952) 53 NLR 25 (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka);
Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History (OUP 2014) 181; Luwie
Ganeshathasan and Asanga Welikala, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: Sri Lanka’ (2017) <https://
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46448/RSCAS_GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_10.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 22 March 2020.
‘Hill Country Tamils of Sri Lanka: Towards Meaningful Citizenship’ (Verité Research and
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion 2019) 19, 28 <https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Verit%C3%A9-Research-Hill-Country-Tamils-of-Sri-Lanka-TowardsMeaningful-Citizenship-1.pdf> accessed 22 March 2020.
Section 2 of the Act grants citizenship to a person who has been a permanent resident of Sri
Lanka since 30 October 1964 or is a descendant of a person who has been a permanent resident of Sri Lanka.
Verité Research and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (n 18) 29. See also ‘Laying the
Foundation for Early Childhood Education in Sri Lanka’ (World Bank Group June 2014)
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23362/Laying0the0Fou0nd0
investing0for0all.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 22 March 2020.
‘Tamil-speaking communities’ is a general reference to the Tamil community (including the
Hill Country Tamil community) and the Muslim community.
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more than two-thirds of the population at that time.22 By implication, a large
number of non-Sinhala speakers were denied employment in the public sector.
By the 1970s, Sinhala speakers dominated employment in the public sector, to
the near exclusion of other linguistic groups.23 The government later adopted
a standardization policy in the 1970s, which replaced the existing system of
determining university admissions solely based on competitive examinations.
The new policy prescribed that the number of admissions from a particular
linguistic group must be proportionate to the number of students attempting
the university entrance examination in that language. Since more candidates
attempted examinations in Sinhala, more university places were reserved for
Sinhala-speaking candidates.24 Therefore, the new policy placed non-Sinhala
speakers at a disadvantage and denied university admissions to many Tamilspeaking candidates despite some of them having obtained higher grades than
some Sinhala-speaking candidates.
The language policy of the state also underscored a class divide. To a
large extent, public sector employment and political patronage privileged the
Sinhala-speaking community25 in the country during the first three decades
following Independence. However, these structures failed to create a pathway
for this community to acquire the skills that are necessary for private sector
employment, following economic liberalisation in the 1970s. One of the primary reasons for this phenomenon was the lack of competence in English,
which was highly valued in the private sector. As fluency in English was not
prioritized in primary and secondary schools, candidates from the ‘Englishspeaking’ community gained an advantage when seeking private sector
employment. The English-speaking community comprised persons who were
fluent in English due to various reasons, including historical affluence. The
disparity in access to private sector employment exacerbated the class divide
and contributed towards the denial of substantive equality of opportunity to the
Sinhala-speaking community. Thus, an official language policy that was principally designed to benefit the Sinhala-speaking community failed to deal with

22

23

24

25

The Sri Lankan population can be classified on ethnic and religious bases. The Sinhalese
constitute 74.9% of the population, Tamils constitute 15.2% (including Hill Country Tamils,
who constitute 4%), and Moors constitute 9.2% of the population. Over 70% of the population is Buddhist. Hindus, Muslims (i.e., adherents of Islam), and Christians constitute 12.6%,
9.7%, and 7.6% of the population, respectively. See ‘Census of Population and Housing, 2012’
(Department of Census and Statistics 2015) <statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/
Activities/Reports/FinalReport/FinalReportE.pdf> accessed 22 March 2020.
Stanley J Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy
(University of Chicago Press 1986) 75.
Sasanka Perara, ‘The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline’
(World Bank Group 2001) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/727811468302711738/
pdf/677060WP00PUBL0io0political0Outline.pdf> accessed 22 March 2020.
While the ‘Sinhala-speaking community’ refers to the linguistic group that comprises ethnically Sinhalese persons, the ‘English-speaking community’ refers to a multi-ethnic group that
comprises persons fluent in English.
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deeper structural inequalities linked to class. The policy eventually impeded
the community’s employability in the private sector.
Two of the three phenomena described above have directly contributed
towards violent conflict in Sri Lanka. The systemic denial of equal opportunities to Tamils drove many of them (particularly in the Northern and Eastern
provinces) towards militancy, which eventuated in an armed struggle that
lasted three decades – between the early 1980s and 2009.26 Meanwhile, the
growing frustration in the Sinhala-speaking community led to two insurrections in the South – one in 1971, and one between 1987 and 1989. Some
scholars have also noted that ethnic riots perpetrated by Sinhala mobs are
sometimes connected to deeper frustrations with respect to unemployment and
class stratification.27 We have not seen a direct link between the denial of equal
opportunities to the Hill Country Tamil community and any major violent conflict. Yet we can link systemic denials of formal and substantive equality of
opportunity to the armed conflicts in the North and East by Tamils, and in the
South by the Sinhala-speaking community.

IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Despite historical denials of formal equality of opportunity, Sri Lanka’s current constitutional framework articulates this norm fairly clearly. This section
explores Sri Lanka’s constitutional framework and critically assesses some of
the lingering gaps that require further legislative intervention.
Article 12(1) of the Sri Lankan Constitution provides: “All persons are equal
before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law”. Article
12(2) provides: “No citizen shall be discriminated against on the grounds of
race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one
of such grounds”. This framework guarantees formal equality of opportunity
to all Sri Lankan citizens. However, two provisos to Article 12(2) authorize
the state to impose certain language requirements for public service appointments. The first proviso stipulates that it shall be lawful to “require a person
to acquire within a reasonable time sufficient knowledge of any language as
a qualification” for employment or office in the public service. However, such
qualification must be “reasonably necessary for the discharge of the duties of
such employment or office”. The second proviso stipulates more generally that
a person can be required to “have a sufficient knowledge of any language as
a qualification for any such employment or office where no function of that
26

27

Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origin and Development in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (UBC Press 2000) 114.
Newton Gunasinghe, ‘The Open Economy and its Impact on Ethnic Relations in Sri Lanka’ in
Deborah Winslow and Michael D Woost (eds), Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka
(Indiana University Press 2004) 99.
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employment or office can be discharged otherwise than with a knowledge of
that language”. For example, if Tamil is the language used by a majority of
customers in a particular area in which a government service is provided, it
may be reasonably necessary that the relevant government officer is competent
in Tamil.
Article 12(3) of the Constitution provides: “No person shall, on the grounds
of race, religion, language, caste, sex or any one of such grounds, be subject to
any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops,
public restaurants, hotels, places of public entertainment and places of public
worship of his own religion”. Therefore, persons have the right not to be discriminated against when accessing even privately-owned establishments listed
in the Article.
Meanwhile, Chapter IV of the Constitution guarantees a range of language
rights. Many of these provisions were introduced through the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which was enacted in 1987. Article 18 provides that Sinhala and Tamil shall be the official languages, with English as
a “link” language. Article 19 then provides that Sinhala and Tamil shall be
“National Languages”. Article 21(1) provides: “A person shall be entitled to be
educated through the medium of either of the National Languages: Provided
that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to an institution of higher
education where the medium of instruction is a language other than a National
Language”. Article 22 provides that any person shall be entitled to receive
communications from and to communicate and transact business with any official in his official capacity in Sinhala, Tamil, or English, regardless of the language of administration in that area.
Despite these broad guarantees of equality and equality of opportunity,
the current constitutional framework contains certain weaknesses. For example, the constitutional provisions that permit limitations on the right to equality and non-discrimination are quite broadly worded. The state is permitted,
under Article 15(7) of the Constitution, to restrict the rights recognized under
Article 12 on several grounds: “the interests of national security, public order
and the protection of public health or morality, or for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society”. These
broad grounds are not unusual in limitation clauses, and are found in both,
international treaty law and national constitutions.28 However, such limitation
clauses usually allow the restriction of exercise of certain freedoms, such as
28

For example, Article 18(3) of the ICCPR authorizes states to limit the freedom to manifest
religion or belief on the grounds of public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others. Also see Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, which authorizes the state to place ‘reasonable restrictions’ on certain freedoms on the basis of ‘the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states,
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the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion or belief, and the freedom
of association. It is relatively rare to find such broad restrictions applying to
the right to equality and non-discrimination. The Sri Lankan Constitution, by
contrast, appears to permit the state to legally limit guarantees of equality and
non-discrimination for these broad purposes. “Law” for the purpose of Article
15(7) includes emergency regulations promulgated under the Public Security
Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947. This combination of factors can legitimize specific
discriminatory measures that are covertly designed to target specific minority groups. For example, regulations that ban attire that conceal a part of the
face are likely to be deemed valid on the grounds of national security, despite
having a discriminatory effect on Muslim women who wear the niqāb (a cloth
that covers the face of a woman). Thus, the constitutional framework allows for
indirect discrimination on the basis of religion.
Many of Sri Lanka’s historical challenges with respect to citizenship and
access to education and employment have been remedied (at least to some
extent) through constitutional and legislative reform. However, as specified
above, some forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the grounds of
religion, are still permitted within the current constitutional framework and are
largely sustained due to Article 15(7) of the Constitution. Meanwhile, serious
denials of substantive equality of opportunity still continue. For instance, the
denial of language rights to Tamil speakers persists in practice.29 Serious gaps
remain in providing state services to Tamil speakers in a language of their
choice. According to a survey conducted by the Centre for Policy Alternatives
in 2017, “the lack of Tamil language proficiency of [state] officers” remains
a core concern.30 Moreover, despite formal guarantees of non-discrimination,
Muslims and Christians are routinely discriminated against in matters pertaining to the freedom of worship.31 In essence, ethno-religious minorities are
denied the opportunity to construct places of worship and engage in teaching
their religion. Moreover, public campaigns were recently launched, calling for
the boycott of Muslim-owned businesses, thereby denying Muslims equality of

29

30
31

public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence’.
‘Survey on the Implementation of Official Languages Policy at Ministerial Level in Sri
Lanka’ (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2017) <https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/Language-Survey-Summary-Report-2017E.pdf> accessed 23 March 2020.
ibid 13.
Gehan Gunatilleke, The Chronic and the Entrenched: Ethno-religious Violence in Sri
Lanka (International Centre for Ethnic Studies 2018); Roshini Wickremesinhe, ‘Confronting
Intolerance: Continued Violations Against Religious Minorities in Sri Lanka’ (Minority
Rights Group International 2016) <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
MRG_Rep_SriLan_Dec16.pdf> accessed 23 March 2020; Sabrina Esufally, ‘Judicial
Responses to Religious Freedom: A Case Analysis’ (Verité Research and National Christian
Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka 2015) <https://minormatters.org/storage/app/uploads/public/5b5/6f3/859/5b56f3859e9b2293487491.pdf> accessed 23 March 2020.
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opportunity in the marketplace.32 As would be discussed later in this article, on
some occasions, state institutions have actively and passively supported such
denials of equality of opportunity to minority groups. Therefore, despite formal guarantees of equality of opportunity, certain communities in Sri Lanka
face serious structural challenges in terms of experiencing equality. We next
turn to the question of why a gap between formal law and socio-political practice still persists in Sri Lanka.

V. STRUCTURAL FACTORS
The previous sections of this article have respectively dealt with the conceptual features of equality of opportunity, Sri Lanka’s history concerning the
denial of equality of opportunity and its relationship to violent conflict, and the
current constitutional framework on equality of opportunity. The present section turns to the question of what drives contemporary denials of equality of
opportunity.
We have learnt thus far that formal guarantees of equality of opportunity
do not always translate into practice. In the context of Sri Lanka, this failure
can be attributed to at least three major socio-political (and cultural) factors:
entitlement complexes, existential fears, and institutional decay. Each of these
structural factors has unique historical and contemporary roots and, in some
way, mutually reinforces the others.

A. Entitlement complexes
Certain communities in Sri Lanka are socialized into believing that they are
entitled to political power and socio-economic benefits by virtue of their identity alone. Such socialization takes place through long-term historical nationalist discourses.
Nationalist discourses often frame Sri Lanka as ‘belonging’ to the SinhalaBuddhist community. A number of scholars point out that the Mahāvamsa
(Great Chronicle) offers a powerful mythological basis for the belief that Sri
Lanka is a Buddhist country and that Sinhala-Buddhists are divinely protected

32

Joanna Slater and Hafeel Farisz, ‘After Sri Lankan attacks, Muslims Face Boycotts and
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at the request of the Buddha himself.33 Thus, this community is often framed
as the ‘host’ of the country, and all other communities are their ‘guests’.34
This narrative of entitlement has been advanced in two principal ways.
First, ideologues such as Hikkadụwe Sri Sumangala Thera,35 Anagarika
Dharmapala, and Piyadasa Sirisena advanced this narrative during the late
19th and early 20th centuries.36 Their works were, in fact, crucial to the formation and galvanization of Sinhala-Buddhism as a distinct and powerful
identity strand. Contemporary ideologues such as Gunadasa Amarasekera and
Nalin de Silva have meanwhile written prolifically on the proclaimed existence
of a “single, overarching Sinhala-Buddhist culture” wherein minorities were
respected, provided they accepted “the norms of the dominant culture as their
own”.37 This ideology has given rise to a distinct political movement based on
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.38 One of the chief proponents of this movement
was Gangodawila Soma Thera, whose message in the late 1990s and early
2000s further galvanized the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist constituency in Sri
Lanka. Political parties such as the Sihala Urumaya, and later the Jathika Hela
Urumaya (‘JHU’), emerged in the 2000s as political alternatives to the mainstream political parties – the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party. The JHU has remained an ideologically powerful party since and has
exerted notable influence over the state.
Second, as a corollary to successful ideological and political projects, school
history curricula unquestioningly incorporate narratives of Sinhala-Buddhist
entitlement to the country. For example, chapter six of the government-issued
33
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history textbook for grade six students contains an account of Dutugemunu,
a Sinhalese ruler, who defeats Elara, a Tamil ruler, who is described as “foreign”; the Sinhalese ruler is portrayed as aiming to “liberate the country from
foreign rule”, “reunite the country”, and “protect Buddhism”.39 According to a
study by UNESCO, Sri Lankan secondary school history textbooks are largely
confined to a Sinhalese-centric history of the country.40 These textbooks often
fail to recognize alternative interpretations of historical events to prompt students to critically reflect on the past. Instead, they reinforce the socialization of
the Sinhala-Buddhist entitlement.
Similar narratives of entitlement can underlie regional host-guest dynamics.
For example, in the Northern Province, the Tamil community may perceive
itself as the host and other communities, including the Muslim community,
as guests. Such host-guest dynamics can underlie ethno-religious tensions
and denial of equality of opportunity to regional minorities. For example, the
denial of equality of opportunity to construct religious institutions may be
grounded in the idea that religious institutions of the minority threaten the
dominant status of the majority religion in that area.41

B. Existential fears
The entitlement complexes of majority communities can also underlie certain existential fears. These fears are often framed in the context of the host
community’s status being threatened by the guest community’s actions. For
Sinhala-Buddhists, these fears often operate at the national level as they are
related to a national-level entitlement complex. Similarly, certain members of
the Hindu, Muslim, and mainline Christian communities may have existential
fears linked to their regional entitlement complexes.
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Muslims’ population growth, so-called Islamic ‘radicalization’, and the perceived Muslim dominance over trade underscore the existential fears of other
communities with regard to their own numerical majority, general safety, and
economic prosperity. The slight statistical increase in the overall population
share of Sri Lankan Moors between 1981 and 2012 – from 7% to 9.2%42 – has
contributed to the fear over Muslim population growth. This fear has driven
campaigns that accuse Muslim restaurants of mixing sterilization pills in the
food consumed by Sinhalese customers.43 Meanwhile, increased competition
between certain Islamist groups, often described as “radical”,44 has led to overt
assertions of Muslim identity and piety, thereby increasing the overall visibility of Muslim religious practices.45 Such competition is often driven by the
availability of and the need to attract funding from Middle Eastern – particularly Saudi Arabian – sources.46 Typical examples of such external manifestations of identity and piety include Muslim women wearing the hijab (various
forms of head covering) and niqāb, and men wearing the white jubba (a long
outer garment resembling an open coat). This visibility has “created an illusion of an increase in the Muslim population, adding to the fear and suspicion
of the majority towards the motives of the Muslim community”.47 Highly visible assertions of Muslim identity through particular forms of attire have also
42
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driven regional inter-communal disputes.48 For example, the recent dispute in
Trincomalee over Muslim teachers wearing abaya (a loose garment that typically covers the head as well) has revealed certain existential fears among the
Tamil Hindu community that Muslims pose a cultural threat.
These general fears are now likely to be compounded following the Easter
Sunday Attacks of April 21, 2019, which claimed the lives of over 250 persons.49 It is generally accepted that a militant Islamist group perpetrated the
violence. This is likely to prompt broader existential fears among multiple
non-Muslim communities and reinforce prejudices against the Muslim community. The manner in which these attacks can spawn new sources of existential
fears and ethno-religious violence is demonstrated in the communal tensions
that have emerged in some of the areas affected by the attacks. On May 5,
2019, several Muslim homes and businesses were attacked in Negombo, a district with a large Roman Catholic population. One of the churches targeted in
the Easter Sunday Attacks is located in Negombo, and it is plausible that the
attacks created tensions between the Catholic majority and the Muslim minority in the area. A dispute over a roadside accident on May 5, 2019 (reportedly
involving a Muslim person) quickly spiralled into anti-Muslim violence. The
state declared curfew in the area and eventually deployed security forces to
neutralize the violence.50 A few days later, anti-Muslim mob-violence erupted
in the districts of Kurunegala and Gampaha. The violence lasted for more than
24 hours and left scores of Muslim-owned homes and businesses destroyed.
The timing of the violence suggests that these were acts of reprisal for, or at
least opportunistically connected to, the Easter Sunday Attacks.51
Another source of existential fear relates to the perception that Muslims
are economically successful. Such fear has prompted calls for the denial of
equal opportunities to Muslim-owned enterprises. Calls to boycott Muslim
businesses or to prevent Muslim vendors from selling their products in certain localities are often driven by fears that Muslims are dominating an economy that Sinhala-Buddhists are entitled to dominate. For example, campaigns
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against halal certification (a system of certifying that certain products are fit
for consumption as per Islamic religious teachings) have sought to create public antagonism towards Muslim-manufactured products.52 The propaganda has
attempted to characterize the certification process as a means of compelling
Muslim consumers to only purchase the products of Muslim-owned enterprises. This propaganda also underscores the systemic exclusion of Muslim
vendors from markets. On occasion, even local government institutions
engage in such discrimination. For example, a local government institution in
Wennappuwa, in the Western Province, temporarily banned Muslim vendors
from selling goods at a public market citing security concerns.53 The decision
was prompted by complaints received by Sinhala residents and business groups
that Muslim vendors with possible links to terrorism were selling goods in the
market.
Christian proselytization is also perceived as a threat to the numerical and
cultural dominance of other communities. This threat has historical roots, as
the propagation of Christianity is associated with European colonial missionary projects, which converted many Buddhists and Hindus to Christianity.54 It
also evokes historical memories of physical, non-physical, and structural violence by European colonial administrators against Buddhists and Hindus.55
While mainline churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, rarely engage
in proselytization in Sri Lanka today,56 smaller churches continue to engage
in the practice. Other communities often perceive this practice as an existential threat. These existential fears underlie violence targeting Christian groups
and systemic discrimination against Christians in the realm of religious practices and worship. According to the National Christian Evangelical Alliance
of Sri Lanka, a Christian civil society organization, 190 incidents of religious
violence against churches, clergy, and Christians were recorded from 2015
to mid-2017.57 This organization also observed an “increase in … the active
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involvement of local government officials” in violence against Christians in
2017.58 Moreover, the selective enforcement of regulatory mechanisms, such as
the 2008 Circular that requires religious places of worship to be registered with
the government, have been used to discriminate against Christian groups.59
Sinhala-Buddhist militant groups such as Bodu Bala Sena have capitalized
on existential fears to justify and instigate violence against religious minority
groups. Campaigns against these minority groups are carefully designed to resonate with the existential fears of majority groups – particularly of SinhalaBuddhists. For example, the call for banning certain Muslim attire, including
the niqāb,60 and the campaign to prohibit “unethical conversions” by Christians
resonates with such existential fears. These fears also underlie the rise of
Tamil Hindu groups such as Siva Senai, which has vowed to campaign against
Christian proselytization and perceived Muslim cultural dominance, particularly in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.61

C. Institutional Decay
Entitlement complexes and existential fears are phenomena that have
emerged over generations and are now somewhat entrenched in Sri Lanka’s
social fabric. One of the primary drivers of this entrenchment is what scholars
such as Neil DeVotta call “institutional decay”.62 According to DeVotta, institutional decay sets in when “the state’s rule-making, applying, adjudicating
and enforcing institutions shower preferential treatment on a particular group
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while disregarding the legitimate grievances of other groups”.63 The simple fact
that over 70% of Sri Lanka’s population can be classified as Sinhala-Buddhist
has, over the decades, shaped the very nature of the state. The deep entrenchment of the will of an identity group that forms two-thirds of the population
has incentivized and sustained decay within institutional structures. Institutions
of the state, including law enforcement agencies, public service institutions,
and, to some extent, the judiciary have grown to display certain predispositions
towards privileging this majority community. Such predispositions undermine
the objectivity of institutions and lead to their decay in terms of safeguarding
meaningful equality of opportunity.
Institutional decay is clearly evident in the way ethno-religious violence is
dealt with in Sri Lanka. Law enforcement authorities have been wilfully reluctant to hold perpetrators from the majority community accountable, thereby
perpetuating a culture of impunity. This impunity has in turn reinforced the
ability of militant groups, and the majority community they represent, to use
violent means to reinforce their dominant status when minority communities
threaten that status. There have been four major incidents of anti-Muslim mob
violence in Sri Lanka in the past six years: Aluthgama in June 2014, Gintota
in November 2017, Digana and Teldeniya in March 2018, and Kurunegala and
Gampaha in May 2019.64 In each episode, the attackers have specifically targeted Muslim businesses, and law enforcement authorities have displayed
reluctance to quell the attacks and arrest perpetrators.65 Prosecutors have
remained hesitant to indict the perpetrators responsible for inciting violence.
For instance, Section 3(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Act, No. 56 of 2007 criminalizes the incitement of violence against a
religious group. Yet there have been no successful convictions of any instigator of anti-Muslim violence in the twelve years since this law was enacted.
Such violence has severely harmed the ability of minority groups such as the
Muslim community to enjoy equal economic opportunities. Thus, institutional
decay contributes to the sustenance of anti-minority violence in Sri Lanka and
eventually to the denial of substantive equality of opportunity.
These mutually reinforcing phenomena can generate frustration among
communities that are denied formal and substantive equality of opportunity.
The emergence of new forms of inter-communal violence, similar to outbreaks in the North-East and South in the past, remains a distinct possibility.
For example, Islamist radicalization in the Eastern Province is likely to draw
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from perceptions (real and imagined) of systemic discrimination and violence
against the Muslim community. There is a plausible connection between widespread anti-Muslim violence and the motivation of Muslims to join militant
Islamist groups seeking to recruit disenchanted young followers. This development creates new fissures in Sri Lanka’s social fabric and sets the stage for
future cycles of communal tension and violence.

VI. CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE
This article presented a case for promoting formal and substantive equality
of opportunity in Sri Lanka. A reading of Sri Lanka’s contemporary socio-political experience suggests that, in practice, legal guarantees have not ensured
meaningful equality of opportunity to minority groups. This article accordingly discussed three factors that drive this problem. First, deeply-rooted
entitlement complexes of majority communities tend to motivate violent and
discriminatory discourses aimed at privileging the majority and denying equality of opportunity to minority groups. Second, existential fears often underlie
militant calls for the denial of equal opportunities to minority groups and the
perpetration of violence against such groups. Third, institutional decay has led
to the systemic privileging of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority and has led to
institutional failure to ensure that minority groups enjoy equality of opportunity and are protected from violence. These contemporary phenomena present
a serious risk of future inter-communal violence. I conclude with some brief
thoughts on how these challenges may be confronted.
Affording all communities in Sri Lanka equality of opportunity involves
certain legislative reform. For example, Article 15(7) of the Constitution
ought to be substantially revised to ensure that the state cannot easily restrict
the right to equality and non-discrimination for broad purposes. However,
such formal legal reform is unlikely to translate into meaningful substantive
equality of opportunity without a process of cultural transformation and institutional reform. Therefore, the real domain of change is likely to be outside
formal constitutional structures. On the one hand, deeply entrenched entitlement complexes and existential fears need to be addressed through a process
of cultural transformation. Such a process must encompass reform of school
curricula, public education, and broader cultural discourses that advance equal
citizenship, egalitarianism, and meritocracy. Furthermore, these initiatives must
be multidimensional. For instance, they must not only motivate majority communities to perceive ‘the other’ as equal citizens but also empower socio-economically disadvantaged members of that majority community to gain the
necessary skills to benefit from a meritocratic society. Such socio-economic
disadvantage can often underlie existential fears that translate into majoritarian
attitudes.
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For example, transformative initiatives must create avenues for Sinhala
speakers to gain competence in English so that they can meaningfully compete
for employment in the private sector. On the other hand, radical institutional
reform may be needed alongside cultural transformation. Institutions must be
depoliticized so as to remove the impetus among institutional actors to appease
and appeal to majoritarian sensibilities. Such a process of institutional reform
is likely to be successful only if it can draw from (and reinforce) a parallel process of cultural transformation.
Equality of opportunity in Sri Lanka can be formally and substantively
guaranteed only through a multi-pronged approach of constitutional, cultural,
and institutional transformation. Such a transformative project is likely to be
difficult and time-consuming, and may extend over an inter-generational time
span. Yet, it is probably indispensable if we are serious about facilitating
meaningful coexistence and ensuring the non-recurrence of violent conflict in
Sri Lanka.

